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We  examine  a simple  repeated  principal-agent  model  with  discounting.  There  are 
a  risk  averse  borrower  with  an  unobservable  random  income  and  a  risk  neutral 
lender.  The  efficient  contract  is  characterized.  It  tends  to  the  first-best  (constant 
consumption)  contract  as the  discount  factor  tends  to  one  and  the  time  horizon 
extends  to  infinity.  If the  time  horizon  is infinite  and  the  contract  is  legally  enfor- 
ceable  the  borrower’s  utility  becomes  arbitrarily  negative  with  probability  one.  If 
the  borrower  has  constant  absolute  risk  aversion  consumption  is  transferred 
between  any two  states at a constant  interest  rate  which  is less than  the  rate  of time 
preference.  Journal  of  Economic  Literature  Classification  Numbers:  026,  315. 
0  1990  Academic  Press.  Inc. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
A  risk  averse  agent  whose  income  fluctuates  will  want  to  stabilise 
consumption  by  borrowing  and  saving.  If  there  is  an  infinite  time  horizon, 
no  discounting  of the  future,  and  income  is  independently  and  identically 
distributed,  consumption  can  be  perfectly  stabilised  at  the  average  value  of 
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income  by  borrowing  and  lending  at  a zero  rate  of interest  (Yaari  [ 143).  If, 
on  the  other  hand,  there  is  just  one  time  period  and  no  outsider  can 
observe  the  agent’s  income  (so there  is  asymmetric  information)  consump- 
tion  cannot  be  stabilized  at  all  The  purpose  of this  paper  is  to  examine, 
when  there  is  asymmetric  informaton,  how debt  contracts  can  be  used  to 
stabilize  consumption  for  any  finite  or  infinite  time  horizon  and  any 
discount  factor  between  zero  and  one. 
The  model  we study  was first  presented  by  Townsend  [13].  There  is  a 
risk  averse borrower  who  has an  i.i.d.  income  stream.  A  risk  neutral  lender 
would  like  to  offer  insurance  but  cannot  observe  the  borrower’s  income, 
past  or  present.  If  the  lender  were  to  offer  to  stabilize  the  borrower’s 
consumption,  the  borrower  would  have  an  incentive  to  claim  his  income  is 
low-such  a  contract  is  not  incentive  compatible.  On  the  other  hand  a 
scheme  in  which  the  amount  lent  is  independent  of the  borrower’s  income 
is  incentive  compatible  but  does  not  share  any  risk.  Grossman,  Levhari, 
and  Mirman  [7]  showed  that  if there  were more  than  one  period  a  simple 
loan  contract  with  a  fixed  rate  of interest  could  provide  some  insurance. 
Townsend  pointed  out  that  these  simple  loan  schemes  are  not  generally 
(constrained)  efficient,  there  being  better  ways of tying  future  transfers  to 
present  claims.  Townsend,  however,  only  partially  characterized  the 
solution  to  the  two-period,  two-state  problem.  We  characterize  the  efficient 
contract  for  any  time  horizon  and  finite  state  space. 
Models  of this  kind  have  a  number  of potential  applications  apart  from 
the  immediate  one  of  how  best  to  insure  an  individual  whose  income  is 
unobservable.  One  is  the  study  of  liquidity  constraints.  Liquidity  con- 
straints,  it  is  often  argued  (for  empirical  support  see, e.g.,  Flavin  [4]),  raise 
the  marginal  propensity  to  consume  out  of income  above  that  predicted 
under  perfect  capital  markets,  and  provide  a  greater  role  for  stabilization 
policy.  In  our  model  of  asymmetric  information  the  borrower  is  con- 
strained  in  an  efficient  contract  by  his  past  history:  if  he  has  borrowed 
heavily  in  the  past  he  will  be  able  to  borrow  less  in  the  current  period 
than  otherwise,  this  despite  the  fact  that  his  future  income  prospects  are 
unaffected.  Another  potential  application  is  the  study  of  international 
debt  contracts.  Naturally  no  simple  model  can  do  the  problem  justice; 
nevertheless  even  in  the  model  studied  here,  which  has  no  capital 
accumulation,  it  is  shown  that  the  borrower  will  inevitably  get  deeper  and 
deeper  into  debt.  What  is  interesting  about  this  result  is  that  the  “debt 
problem”  is  a consequence  of an  efficient  contract. 
In  this  paper  we follow  the  methodology  set  out  in  Townsend  [13]  and 
view  loan  contracts  as  constrained  Pareto  efficient  agreements  between 
borrowers  and  lenders,  so  that  no  mutually  beneficial  gains  remain 
unexploited.  It  is  shown  (Sections  3 and  4)  that  the  efficient  loan  contract 
corresponds  to  the  solution  of a dynamic  programming  problem.  This  has INCOME  FLUCTUATION  369 
two  important  consequences.  First  the  continuation  of the  loan  contract  is 
efficient  at  every  date  so the  borrower  and  lender  will  never  mutually  agree 
to  renegotiate  the  contract.  This  is not  to  say that  one  or  other  party  will 
not  wish  to  break  the  contract  ex post;  it  is  however  assumed  (apart  from 
Section  8)  that  the  contract  is  legally  enforceable  and  therefore  cannot  be 
broken.  Second,  at  any  time  the  future  course  of the  contract  is determined 
solely  by  knowledge  of a state  variable.  In  particular,  this  state  variable  can 
be  interpreted  as the  “indebtedness”  of the  borrower,  where  indebtedness 
represents  the  expected  future  net  payments  due  to  the  lender. 
Section  5  presents  the  main  and  perhaps  most  surprising  result  of the 
paper.  If  the  time  horizon  is  infinite  the  borrower’s  future  utility  becomes 
arbitrarily  negative  with  probability  one.  The  borrower  gets  deeper  and 
deeper  into  debt,  and  consumption  moves  down  as  debt  increases.  The 
contract  is  therefore  not  very  good  at  stabilizing  consumption  over  time; 
nevertheless  what  appears  to  be  happening  is  that  making  future  utilities 
low reduces  the  cost  of inducing  incentive  compatibility,  which  is obtained 
by  variations  in  future  utility.  So  stability  in  consumption  in  the  initial 
periods  is obtained  at  a cost  of variation  in  consumption  over  time. 
While  this  result  is  of  considerable  interest  in  its  own  right,  it  also 
implies  that  if  the  discount  factor  is  allowed  to  converge  to  one  and  the 
time  horizon  is infinite,  the  efficient  contract  cannot  converge  uniformly  to 
the  first-best,  constant-consumption  contract.  Nevertheless  the  results  of 
Radner  [lo]  suggest  that  it  should  be  possible  to  approach  first-best 
utilities.  The  dynamic  programming  approach  permits  a simple  and  natural 
proof  of this  since  as we show in  Section  6, the  second-best  Pareto  frontier 
converges  pointwise  to  the  first-best  frontier  as the  discount  factor  tends  to 
one  and  the  time  horizon  tends  to  infinity. 
In  Section  7  we  consider  the  special  case  where  the  borrower  has  an 
exponential  utility  function  so that  wealth  effects are  excluded.  The  efficient 
contract  is  explicitly  solved  for:  it  transfers  consumption  between  any  two 
states at  a constant  rate  of interest,  which  is positive,  but  less than  the  com- 
mon  rate  of time  preference.  Thus  a kind  of “soft  loan”  can  be the  best  way 
of insuring  an  agent  whose  income  is  unobservable;  this  is  very  intuitive, 
since  the  first-best  contract,  which  stabilizes  consumption,  involves  an 
implicit  interest  rate  of minus  one,  but  is not  incentive  compatible,  whereas 
a  loan  contract  with  rate  of  interest  equal  to  the  rate  of  time  preference, 
while  avoiding  incentive  problems,  is  not  very  good  at  smoothing 
consumption  since when  income  is low,  the  agent  will  be  discouraged  from 
borrowing  to  smooth  his  consumption  by  the  high  interest  costs. 
Finally  in  Section  8 we drop  the  enforceability  assumption  and  examine 
self-enforcing  contracts.  This  is  important  because  the  results  of Section  5 
show that  for  any  fixed  penalty  associated  with  reneging,  the  borrower  will 
eventually  want  to  renege  with  probability  one.  It  is  shown  that  a  non- 370  THOMAS  AND  WORRALL 
trivial  self-enforcing  contract  will  exist  for  discount  factors  near  unity,  and 
that  such  contracts  do  not  use termination  as an  incentive  device. 
The  dynamic  programming  approach  to  repeated  asymmetric  informa- 
tion  models  was introduced  by  Green  [S]  in  his  seminal  paper  on  social 
insurance.  In  his  model  there  is  a  continuum  of risk  averse  agents,  each 
with  unobservable,  i.i.d.  zero-one  income  streams  and  exponential  utility 
functions  who  would  like  to  insure  one  another.  Green  shows  that 
consumption  is  a  random  walk  with  drift  added  to  an  i.i.d.  term,  a  result 
we also  obtain  in  the  exponential  case. The  drift  term  is  however  negative, 
so  Green’s  scheme  would  only  make  sense if the  community  as a whole  is 
able  to  borrow  in  the  initial  periods:  an  outside  resource  borrowed  at  the 
rate  of time  preference  is  necessary  to  finance  the  scheme,  whereas  in  our 
model  the  negative  drift  term  implies  that  the  borrower  gets  deeper  into 
debt.’  While  we  consider  only  a  two  person  model,  our  main  results 
are  valid  for  all  utility  functions  satisfying  non-increasing  absolute  risk 
aversion,  and  for  general  Lid.  processes  and  time  horizons.  Moreover,  we 
characterise  the  asymptotic  properties  of efficient  contracts  both  as  time 
goes  to  infinity  and  as the  discount  rate  goes  to  zero. 
The  dynamic  programming  approach  .is  also  used  by  Spear  and 
Srivastava  [I  l]  to  study  a  repeated  moral  hazard  problem  in  contrast  to 
the  hidden  information  problem  studied  here.  Assuming  the  validity  of the 
first-order  approach  and  the  existence  of  a  differentiable  solution  they 
examine  the  time  structure  of  an  efficient  contract.  According  as  output 
exceeds or  falls  short  of a  critical  level  the  future  utility  of the  agent  rises 
or  falls.  Similarly  in  our  model  the  future  utility  of the  borrower  will  rise 
or  fall  according  to  the  size  of his  current  income.  They  do  not,  however, 
examine  the  long-run  properties  of efficient  contracts  which  are  one  of our 
main  concerns  here. 
2. THE  MODEL 
As mentioned  in  the  introduction  we use the  basic  model  introduced  by 
Townsend  [ 13 J.  There  are  a  borrower  and  a  lender  who  both  live  T+  1 
periods  and  can  trade  a  single  non-storable  consumption  good  which  we 
call  income.  Both  try  to  maximise  lifetime  utility  and  discount  the  future  by 
the  common  discount  factor  LXE  (0,  1).  At  each  date  t =  0,  1, .  .  .  . T,  the 
borrower  has  a random  income  s, which  takes  on  one  of N  possible  values, 
to,,  02, .  ..? 0,).  We  call  this  set  of  income  values  0  and  index  it  by 
s=  { 1, 2, .  .  .  . N}  (by  convention  Bi >  0,  for  all  i >j,  i, Jo  S).  It  is  assumed 
that  s, is identically  and  independently  distributed  and  that  the  probability 
of income  13~  is  ni,  independent  of t,  where  xi,  s 7ti =  1. 
1 We  are  grateful  to  an associate  editor  for  drawing  our  attention  to  this  paper. INCOMEFLUCTUATION  371 
The  borrower  is  risk  averse  and  has  a  time-separable  utility  function 
which  satisfies 
Assumption  1.  The  per  period  utility  function  of  the  borrower  is 
v:(a,co)+R:v  is  C2  with  supv(c)<co,  infv(c)=--,  v’>O,  v”<O, 
-  v”/v’  non-increasing  and  lim,  _ ~ v’(c)  =  co. 
There  are  two  slightly  non-standard  assumptions  here.  First  it  is 
assumed  that  the  borrower’s  absolute  risk  aversion  is  non-increasing.  This 
is a sufficient  condition  for  the  valuation  function  of the  dynamic  program- 
ming  problem  solved  later  on  to  be  concave.  Second  it  is  assumed  that 
utility  is unbounded  below.  This  greatly  facilitates  the  analysis  in  Section  5 
and  in  particular  fits  the  special  case  of  constant  absolute  risk  aversion 
which  we consider  in  Section  7. 
The  lender  is  assumed  to  be  risk  neutral  and  therefore  would  be 
prepared  to  offer insurance  to  the  borrower.  The  problem  is  that  although 
the  lender  knows  how  income  is  distributed  and  knows  Assumption  1  he 
cannot  observe  actual  income  either  contemporaneously  of retrospectively. 
Thus  if he were to  offer the  borrower  perfect  insurance  the  borrower  would 
always  under  report  income.  However,  we  know  from  the  Revelation 
Principle*  that  if  there  is  any  way  in  which  the  lender  can  provide  some 
insurance  for  the  borrower  there  is an  equivalent  incentive  compatible  way 
in  which  the  borrower  reports  his  true  income.  Thus  it  is  possible  to  write 
bT+‘(h’),  (the  payment  at  t,  from  the  lender  to  the  borrower  if positive,  a 
repayment  if  negative)  as  a  function  of history,  h’=  (so,  si,  .  .  .  . s,) E @‘+  ‘, 
and  define 
DEFINITION  1.  A  loan  contract  bT+  ’  is  a  sequence  of  functions 
(b~+l),=O,t  ,_,_,  T,  where  each  b:”  : @‘+I  +(a--~,,  00). 
Allen  [l]  has  shown  that  if the  borrower  can  save and  borrow  at  a rate 
of interest  equal  to  the  rate  of time  preference  unobserved  by  the  lender 
then  there  is no  feasible  loan  contract  which  provides  insurance.  For  in  this 
case  the  borrower  will  evaluate  any  series  of  payments  by  its  expected 
discounted  value..  Incentive  compatibility  then  requires  that  all  series  of 
payments  must  yield  the  same  expected  discounted  value,  so no  risk  can  be 
shared.  Many  contracts,  however,  contain  explicit  provisions  to  control 
outside  transactions;  for  example  bank  loans  usually  require  that  other 
debts  be disclosed  and  most  insurance  contracts  are  void  if it  is found  that 
material  facts were unreported.  Therefore  we adopt  the  assumption  that  the 
lender  can  monitor  or  control  all  the  borrower’s  outside  transactions. 
We  know  from  Townsend  [ 131  or  from  Grossman,  Levhari,  and 
Miman  [7]  that  there  do  exist  incentive  compatible  contracts  when outside 
’  The  Revelation  Principle  holds  for  any  time  horizon  and  any  stochastic  structure. 372  THOMASANDWORRALL 
transactions  can  be  monitored.  We  let  BT+’  be  the  set of  these  incentive 
compatible  loan  contracts.  It  is described  by  a series  of inequalities  similar 
to  those  typical  in  one  period  incentive  contracts  (e.g.,  Hart  [8]).  To  be 
precise,  for  any  given  contract  b *+  ’  and  some  date  t  let  V, be  the  highest 
expected  future  utility  (discounted  to  date  t +  1)  which  the  borrower  can 
get  if he  reports  his  income  at  date  t  to  be  r, =  ~9~.  Since  income  is i.i.d.  Vi 
depends  only  upon  the  reported  history,  g’=  (rO, Y,, .  .  .  . rr),  and  not  upon 
the  actual  history,  h’=  (so, si,  .  .  .  . 3,). Let  bi =  br+  ‘(g’-I,  tYi) be the  amount 
borrowed  at  time  t  if  rr =  ei  and  the  past  reported  history  is g’-  ‘.  Then  if 
b T+’  is  incentive  compatible,  i.e.,  if the  borrower  never  has an  incentive  to 
lie, 
v(bi+f$)+d’i3v(bi+0,)+d’,  (1) 
for  every  g’-  ‘,  t =  1, 2, .  .  .  . T,  and  all  i, je  S.  Thus  BT+  ’ =  {bT+  ’  satisfying 
Eq.  (1)). 
3.  THE  DYNAMIC  PROGRAMMING 
CHARACTERISATION  OF  EFFICIENT  CONTRACTS 
An  incentive  compatible  loan  contract  is efficient  if it  is undominated  by 
any  other  incentive  compatible  contract.  Efficient  contracts  can  be charac- 
terized  by  a  dynamic  program.  The  basic  idea  is  simple:  in  an  efficient 
contract  after  any  history  h’,  with  s, =  8,,  the  remaining  part  of the  contract 
from  date  t +  1 onwards,  the  continuation  contract,  must  itself  be efficient. 
Otherwise  replacing  it  by an  efficient  continuation  contract  which  gives  the 
borrower  the  same  expected  future  utility,  Vi,  from  date  t +  1 onwards  will 
make  the  lender  better  off. (Note  that  the  new continuation  contract  must 
give  the  borrower  exactly  V,  and  no  more;  otherwise  an  incentive  com- 
patible  constraint,  Eq.  (l),  in  some  other  state  at  date  t might  be  violated). 
It  only  remains  to  check  that  the  new contract  is itself incentive  compatible. 
If  income  is  not  i.i.d.  then  the  future  income  stream  of  the  borrower 
depends  upon  the  actual  history,  while  future  loans  and  repayments  depend 
upon  the  reported  history.  Therefore,  although  the  continuation  part  of the 
contract  after  the  history  h’  is,  by  definition,  incentive  compatible,  the  new 
series of loans  and  repayments  promised  after  this  history  might  look  more 
attractive  than  the  old  series  after  some  other  history  h”.  In  this  case the 
history  h’  may  be  reported  even  when  the  true  history  is  h”.  If  income  is 
i.i.d.  this  cannot  happen  since  Vi  does  not  depend  upon  actual  history. 
Thus  the  new contract  will  be  incentive  compatible  for  every  possible  h’. 
Because  the  continuation  contract  is efficient,  the  future  utilities  of the  two 
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problem.3  Moreover  the  utilities  must  be  chosen  on  the  frontier  to  solve  a 
dynamic  programming  optimality  equation.  Any  set  of  future  utilities  for 
the  borrower  Vi  can  be  chosen  together  with  the  current  transfers  bi so 
long  as (1)  is  satisfied  and  the  necessary  overall  utility  for  the  borrower  is 
exactly  attained.  So  the  optimality  equation  will  say  that  these  variables 
must  be chosen  to  maximise  the  lender’s  utility  subject  to  these constraints. 
It  should  be  stressed  that  maximising  lender’s  utility  subject  to  giving  the 
borrower  a  certain  utility  is  just  one  way  of  characterising  efficient 
contracts;  doing  it  the  other  way  around  will  lead  to  the  same  contracts. 
The  dynamic  programming  approach  we adopt  treats  the  borrower’s  net 
future  utility,  relative  to  autarky,  as the  state  variable.4  So  the  first  step  will 
be  to  describe  how the  lender’s  future  utility  depends  on  this  state  variable. 
First  we consider  contracts  of a  given  length:  a  contract  of length  k,  that 
is  with  k  periods  remaining,  bk,  begins  at  T-k  +  1.  Then  the  set  of  k 
period  incentive  compatible  contracts  that  give  the  borrower  a net  expected 
utility  of  V is 
{ 
k-l 
Bk(I’)=  bkEBk:  E  1  a’(v(br(h’)+s,)-v(s,))=  V 
7=0  1 
, 
where  E  is  the  expectations  operator  over  all  future  income  levels.  The 
maximum  expected  discounted  utility  the  lender  can  get  from  a  k period 
contract  when  the  borrower  gets  V  can  now  be  defined;  this  is  just  the 
constrained  Pareto  frontier  for  the  k period  problem. 
DEFINITION  2.  The  lender’s  value  function  with  k  periods  to  go  is 
k-l 
u,(v)=  sup  -  E  1  cr’b$f  ) 
bkp&(V)  1=0 
for  any  VE  (-co,  dk),  where  dk =  (SUP  V(c)  -  zieS  XiV(Oi))(I  -  ctk)/(  1 -CC). 
It  represents  the  expected  discounted  value  of the  series  of future  loans 
and  repayments,  and  can  therefore  be thought  of as the  level  of “indebted- 
ness”  of the  borrower  to  the  lender  at  any  particular  time.  While  it  is  more 
convenient  to  work  in  terms  of  the  borrower’s  utility  V  as  the  state 
variable,  the  level  of indebtedness  is  directly  related  to  it  through  the  value 
function  at  any  date. 
3 As  remarked  in  the  introduction,  this  argument  implies  that  there  will  never  be  an 
incentive  to  renegotiate  the  contract  since  any renegotiation  would  make  at  least  one  party 
worse  off. 
4 Since  there  are  two  agents  in  the  problem,  there  should  normally  be  two  optimality 
equations  describing  the  evolution  of utility  in  terms  of the  state  variable.  Since  it  is possible 
to  define  the  borrower’s  future  utility  as  the  state  variable  we  need  only  consider  one 
optimality  equation  as the  other  becomes trivial.  We  thank  Vincent  Brousseau  for  this  remark. 374  THOMASANDWORRALL 
For  T=  co  the  lender’s  value  function,  which  is  independent  of time,  is 
denoted  U,(V).  The  value  U,(V)  is not  defined  to  the  right  of dk  but  if we 
let  U,(Y)  =  -  co  for  V>  d,  each  Uk  is  defined  on  the  common  interval 
(-co,  d,)  and  takes  values  in  the  extended  reals.  Thus  it  is  possible  to 
define  the  following 
DEFINITION  3.  For  any  function  U  : ( -  co, d,,)  --f R u  { -  cc }  the  one- 
step  operator  L  satisfies 
L(  U)(  v =  sup  c  n,(-b;+aU(VJ), 
(h,.  v,),,sEn(r’)  ies 
:biE(a-l?,,  co),  V,E(-m,d,); 
~~sni(v(6;+A,)-v(B,)+rV,)=  K 
v(b,+8,)+ccVi~v(bj+8,)+aVjforalli,jES  . 
1 
The  fundamental  optimality  equation  of the  dynamic  programming  algo- 
rithm  is  given  in  Lemma  1  (all  proofs,  and  statements  of further  lemmas, 
are  relegated  to  the  appendix). 
LEMMA  1.  For  k  2  1 the  one-step  operator  L  defines  the  value functions 
recursively  through  the  optimality  equation 
The  optimality  equation  shows  how  the  value  functions  may  be  com- 
puted.  In  the  finite  horizon  problem  U,  is  found  recursively  by  repeated 
application  of L  starting  from  U,rO;  the  optimum  values  of  (bj,  Vi)iES 
which  are  chosen  at  each  application  of  L  then  constitute  the  contract 
which  achieves  the  utilities  corresponding  to  the  constrained  Pareto 
frontier  for  the  k  period  problem.  In  the  infinite  horizon  problem  U,  is  a 
fixed  point  of L. 
To  study  the  infinite  horizon  problem  it  would  be  helpful  for  both 
analytical  and  computational  reasons  to  know  if the  sequence  of functions, 
U,,  converges  to  U,  as  k  -+  co.  While  they  do  not  converge  in  the 
supremum  metric  (since  they  cannot  be restricted  to  the  same  metric  space 
in  this  metric),  pointwise  convergence  can  nevertheless  be  proven.  To  use 
standard  arguments  it  will  be  necessary  to  restrict  the  space  of functions. 
There  are  natural  bounds  on  U,(V).  Consider  first  the  contract  which  pays 
a  constant  amount  yk  at  all  dates,  where  y,  satisfies  CiES  n,(v(  yk +  0;) - INCOME  FLUCTUATION  315 
v(e,))(  1 -  G?),/( 1 -  a) =  V. It  is  trivially  incentive  compatible  and  gives  the 
borrower  a net  utility  of  V. Therefore  the  lender’s  utility  from  this  contract 
provides  a  lower  bound  to  U,(V).  On  the  other  hand  U,(V)  can  give  the 
lender  no  more  than  the  unconstrained  first-best  contract  which  pays  ck-s, 
at  all  dates,  where  ck  satisfies  CieS  ~c~(v(c~)-v(~~))(~  -&)/(l  -a)  =  V. 
Thus 
-(1-ak)yk/(l-a)dU,(V)<(l-ak)  1  iTi(Oi-C,)/(l-a),  (3) 
isS 
and  in  the  limit,  using  an  obvious  notation, 
-y,/(l---a)<U*(V)<  ~7~~(8~-c,)/(l-a). 
i‘ZS 
(4) 
These  bounds  tie  down  U,  quite  tightly,  as  depicted  in  Fig.  1;  since 
lim,  -  D  v’(c)=co,  lim,,-,C$(V)=O,  and  limV,,,Ub(V)=  -co.  If 
a=  -co  then  lim  y-r --m U,(V)  =  co,  while  it  is  finite  if a >  -  00. Similarly 
lim  V+rlk U,(  V) =  -co.  Let  F  be  the  space  of  continuous  functions  on 
(-co,  d,)  lying  between  the  bounds  in  (4).  Since  the  gap  between  these 
bounds  is  itself  bounded,  F  is  a  complete  metric  space  in  the  supremum 
metric,  and  by  standard  arguments  L  is a  contraction  in  F  (Lemma  2).  So 
U,  is  the  unique  fixed  point  of  L  in  the  space  F  and  for  any  UE  F, 
lim  k _ o. Lk( U)  =  U,.  To  show  that  U,  is  the  limit  of  the  finite  horizon 
value  functions  is  not  straightforward  as  U,  4 F.  Nevertheless  Lemma  3 
FIG.  1.  The  bounds  on  the  value  function. 
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shows  that  lim,  _ Ix, U,  is  a fixed  point  of L  and  since  the  limit  belongs  to 
F  (take  limits  in  (3))  it  follows  that  lim,,  nrJ  U,  =  U*. 
4.  THE  EFFICIENT  CONTRACT 
To  calculate  the  efficient  contract  it  is  necessary  to  solve  the  program- 
ming  problem  defined  by  Eq.  (2).  (S ince  L  is  a  contraction  mapping  a 
necessary  and  sufficient  condition  for  efficiency  is  that  the  supremum  in 
Definition  3  be  attained  for  every  k.  This  is  guaranteed  by  Assumption  1.) 
To  solve  this  problem  we  need  to  show  that  the  value  functions  are 
concave.  Starting  with  U,  =  0,  it  is  straightforward  to  see that  U,(V)  is 
strictly  concave.  Therefore  we  will  invoke  the  induction  hypothesis  and 
assume  U,-  1( V)  is  strictly  concave  too. 
To  tackle  the  maximisation  problem  of  Definition  3  it  is first  necessary 
to  simplify  the  constraint  set.  Rewrite  Eq.  (1)  as  CVrv(bj+8,)- 
v(bi +  ai)  +  tl( Vi -  V,) b  0.  This  equation  states  that  the  borrower  must  be 
induced  to  report  the  true  income  Qj rather  than  the  false income  0,.  Since 
v is concave,  it  is easily  shown  (see, for  example,  Hart  [I?]  ) that  if the  local 
downward  constraints  Ci,+,  3 0  and  upward  constraints  Ci,i+  I  3 0  hold 
for  each  i E S  then  the  global  constraints  C,  2  0  hold  for  each  i, je  S.  It  is 
intuitively  unlikely  that  the  borrower  should  wish  to  report  a  higher 
income  than  he  actually  has,  so  it  is  to  be  expected  that  the  downward 
incentive  compatibility  constraints  will  bind  at  the  optimum,  and  this  is 
what  Lemma  4  proves.  It  is  shown,  under  the  induction  hypothesis  that 
Uk-  ,( I’)  is  strictly  concave,  that  all  the  local  downward  incentive  com- 
patibility  constraints,  Ci,, _ , 3  0, always  bind  and  none  of the  local  upward 
incentive  compatibility  constraints,  Ci. ;+  1 2 0,  ever do.  This  means  that  the 
borrower  is  always  just  indifferent  about  reporting  that  his  income  was 
actually  a little  lower  than  it  was, but  would  never  want  to  report  that  his 
income  was in  fact  higher. 
It  also  follows  from  the  concavity  of  v  and  adding  Ci,iP  1 2  0  and 
C, _ ,,i >  0  that  6,  1 >  bi and  Vi >  VjP  i.  This  of itself  imposes  considerable 
structure  on  the  contract.  For  example,  in  low  income  states  more  is 
borrowed  but  at  the  cost  of  a  lower  future  utility  or  a  greater  level  of 
indebtedness  for  the  borrower.  (This  would  of  course  not  be  true  of  the 
first-best  contract  where  what  is  borrowed  today  does  not  affect  future 
indebtedness).  Further,  Lemma  4  shows  that  the  optimum  contract 
involves  coinsurance  so  that  the  lender’s  expected  future  utility  is  also 
lower  when  the  borrower’s  income  is lower. 
Having  simplified  the  constraint  set we are  in  a position  to  consider  the 
properties  of the  value  function  U,(V).  It  is obviously  decreasing,  but  it  is 
not  so  obvious  that  it  is  concave  because  the  constraint  set  itself  is  not INCOME  FLUCTUATION  377 
convex.  Since,  however,  the  borrower’s  utility  function  exhibits  N.I.A.R.A. 
(Assumption  1)  it  can  be  shown  that  there  is  a  unique  (bi,  VJiEs  which 
attains  the  supremum  in  Definition  3,  so  the  efficient  contract  is  unique, 
and  strict  concavity  can  be  proved. 
PROPOSITION  1.  There is a unique (bi,  Vi)iGs which attains the supremum 
in  Definition  3.  U,(V)  is decreasing, strictly  concave, and continuously  dif- 
ferentiable  on (-  co, dk) and U,(V)  is decreasing,  concave, and continuously 
differentiable  on (-  CO,  d,). 
The  efficient  contract  is  stationary  in  the  sense that  V  incorporates  all 
the  information  necessary  to  calculate  (bi,  Vi)isS.  That  is,  V  contains  all 
the  necessary  information  about  past  history.  Thus  the  efficient  contract 
can  be  determined  recursively  by  solving  the  optimality  equation  starting 
with  some  initial  value  of  V,  which  may  be  considered  to  be  determined 
either  by  market  forces  or  by  some  bargaining  procedure  if there  is imper- 
fect competition.  Since  there  is a one-to-one  correspondence  between  V  and 
U,(V)  the  efficient  contract  is somewhat  like  a standard  borrowing/lending 
contract  in  which  the  key  variable  is  the  borrower’s  indebtedness.  To 
determine  the  current  transfers  it  is  only  necessary  to  know  the  level  of 
indebtedness.  This  analogy  will  be  made  even  clearer  in  Section  7  which 
examines  the  constant  absolute  risk  aversion  case.  These  results  are 
summarized  by  the  following  proposition: 
PROPOSITION  2.  For  any  T  there exists an efficient  coinsurance contract 
such that  after  any  history  bi 6 b,-  ,,  Vi3  V/i- 1,  i = 2, 3, .  . .  . N.  The  local 
upward  incentive  compatibility  constraints never  bind,  the  local  downward 
incentive compatibility  constraints always do. 
If  we  let  L,  (pi)iss,  be  the  multipliers  associated  with  the  constraints 
~i,,~i(v(bi+t3i)-v(Oi)+clVi)=  V,  Cii-,  20,  the  first  order  necessary 
conditions  for  a  solution  to  the  optimality  equation  are5 
“i(l-~v’(bi+8i))=~iVr(bi+~i)-~i+lv’(bi+Bi+1),  (5) 
71i(U;--l(vi)+~)=~i+l-~i,  (6) 
for  i=  2, 3, .  .  .  . N,  where  pl=pN+l  =O,  together  with  the  envelope  condi- 
tion 
r.&(V)=  -1.  (7) 
5 Ed  Green  has pointed  out  to  us that  a solution  to  these  equations  need  not  be feasible. 
They  are  however  necessary at  the  optimum,  and  we  only  need  suffkiency in  calculating  the 
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5.  THE  INFINITE  HORIZON  CONTRACT 
We  shall  concentrate  on  the  case T=  cc for  the  rest  of the  paper.  In  this 
section  we consider  the  long  run  properties  of an  efficient  infinite  horizon 
contract.  Because  the  infinite  horizon  value  function  U,  is  independent  of 
time,  the  relationship  between  V and  the  current  transfers  does  not  change, 
so we need  only  look  at  how  V varies  through  time.  We  define  V’  to  be the 
random  variable  representing  the  borrower’s  utility  at  the  beginning  of 
period  t. It  is possible  to  show that,  at  any  date  t,  VN >  V>  V,  (Lemma  5), 
so that  the  level  of indebtedness  rises after  the  lowest  income  state  and  falls 
after  the  highest  income  state.  A  slightly  stronger  result  can  also  be 
demonstrated:  if the  borrower  experiences  a  long  enough  sequence  of high 
income  states  he  will  eventually  become  a creditor,  and  if he experiences  a 
long  enough  sequence  of  low  income  states  he  will  become  a  debtor 
(Lemma  5).  So  V’  can  rise  or  fall,  but  it  would  be  of considerable  interest 
to  discover  its  long  run  tendency.  To  do  this  we use  the  fact  that  viewed 
as  a  stochastic  process  Ui(  V)  is  a  non-positive  martingale.  To  see this 
consider  increasing  the  borrower’s  utility  at  any  date  by  one  unit.  One  way 
of doing  this  is  to  increase  every  Vi by  a factor  of  l/cr  while  keeping  every 
bj  constant.  Such  a change  preserves incentive  compatibility  at  a cost  to  the 
lender  of CiEs  niU;  ( Vi).  By  the  envelope  theorem  this  is  locally  as good 
a  way  to  increase  V  as  any  other  and  so  is  equal  to  Ui  (V).  Formally, 
summing  (6)  over  i E S  and  using  (7)  yields 
1  7t, U;  ( Vi)  =  U;(  V). 
res 
Then  using  the  martingale  convergence  theorem  it  is possible  to  prove: 
PROPOSITION  3.  Zf  T=  co,  V’  converges  to  -  CO almost  surely. 
The  idea  behind  the  proof  is quite  simple.  U;(  V’)  must  converge  almost 
surely,  so it  only  needs  to  be  shown  that  it  does not  converge  to  a non-zero 
limit  with  positive  probability,  since  if  Ui(  V’)  converges  to  zero,  V’ 
converges  to  -co,  Likewise  if  Ui(  V’)  converges  to  a  non-zero  limit,  V’ 
converges  to  a  finite  limit.  However,  because  the  future  Vi’s  are  always 
spread  out  to  aid  incentive  compatibility  it  can  be  shown  that  this  only 
happens  with  zero  probability. 
The  economic  intuition  behind  the  result  seems  to  be  that  the  cost  of 
incentive  compatibility  is in  some  sense cheaper  when  V is low.  To  see this 
first  note  that  the  advantage  of having  a history  dependent  contract  stems 
from  using  future  utility,  the  Vi’s,  as inducements  to  truth-telling.  To  do 
this  they  must  differ.  Since  U,  is concave  this  is costly  because  the  lender’s 
future  utility  falls  as  the  dispersion  of  the  Vi’s  increases.  For  example,  if INCOME  FLUCTUATION  319 
N=  2 the  cost  of spreading  Vi  and  V2 an  equal  small  amount  z either  side 
of  their  average  value,  V’,  is  approximately  -(l/2)  z’Ui(  I”).  From  the 
properties  of  U,  at  its  endpoints  it  follows  that  lim.,  --m UG (V)  =  0,  and 
limv,dm  Ug (V)  =  -  co. Thus  while  it  is  not  possible  to  assert  that  U;(V) 
is  monotonically  decreasing  (it  is monotonic  in  the  example  in  Section  7) 
it  must  decline  on  average  which  is  all  that  is needed  to  prove  the  result. 
Thus  the  cost  of obtaining  a  given  spread  of  V,  and  V,  is  generally  lower 
when  they  themselves  are  lower:  incentive  compatibility  is  in  this  sense 
cheaper  when  future  utilities  are  lower.  Therefore  although  it  is preferable 
to  try  to  keep  V constant  in  order  to  smooth  consumption  over  time  there 
is a strong  enough  incentive  to  cause it  to  drift  downwards.  A contract  then 
in  which  V declines  over  time  can  induce  the  borrower  to  tell  the  truth  by 
using  large  variability  in  future  utility  and  at  the  same  time  smooth 
consumption  in  the  initial  periods. 
6.  THE EFFICIENT  CONTRACT  FOR DISCOUNT  FACTORS  CLOSE  TO  ONE 
Although  Proposition  3 shows that  the  efficient  contract  cannot  converge 
uniformly  to  the  first-best  contract,  the  results  of Radner  [lo]  and  Fuden- 
berg,  Holmstrom,  and  Milgrom  [3]  strongly  suggest  that  first-best  utilities 
can  be  approached  as the  discount  factor  gets  close  to  unity.  Radner  uses 
a  statistical  approach  based  on  a  contract  which  penalizes  the  agent 
periodically  if his  record  does  not  meet  a  specified  standard.  Such  a rule  is 
not  usually  efficient  nor  necessarily  incentive  compatible,  but  for  discount 
factors  close  enough  to  one  the  periods  of punishment  become  insignificant 
relative  to  the  periods  of first-best  payments.  Fudenberg,  Holmstrom,  and 
Milgrom  adopt  a  different  approach  in  which  the  agent  can  covertly 
borrow  and  save at  a  rate  of interest  equal  to  the  rate  of time  preference. 
The  agent’s  ability  to  self-insure  in  this  way  effectively  reduces  his  risk 
aversion  in  any  given  period  and  in  the  limit  he  behaves  as if he  were risk 
neutral. 
The  dynamic  programming  approach  affords  a  simple  and  natural  proof 
of  this  convergence  result.  In  particular  it  can  be  shown  that  the  second- 
best  Pareto-frontier  converges  pointwise  to  the  first-best  frontier6  and  that 
the  efficient  contract  payments  converge  pointwise  to  the  first-best  levels. 
This  second  result  complements  Radner’s  result  that  payments  are  at  their 
first-best  levels  in  almost  every  period  in  the  limit.  To  keep  expected  future 
utility  bounded  as c1+  1 all  per-period  utilities  are  multiplied  by  (1 -  01)  in 
this  section.  Let  VT  be  the  borrower’s  normalised  discounted  future  utility 
and  U:  (I’s)  the  corresponding  utility  of the  lender.  For  any  given  Y the 
6  For  more  details  in a more  general  model  see Lockwood  and  Thomas  [9]. 380  THOMASANDWORRALL 
first-best  contract  gives  the  lender  an  expected  return  of  -ZieS  rcibF, 
where  v(bF +  ei) =  V for  all  i E S.  It  is  necessary  to  show lim,  ~,  U”,(V)  = 
-,YiEszib,+.  Consider  the  following  contract.  In  the  first  period  pay  by. 
This  implies  that  CiES7ci Vi=  V,  and  it  is  possible  to  choose  the  Vi’s  to 
satisfy  the  downward  incentive  constraints  with  equality  since  they  are  all 
linear  in  Vi.  Then  follow  the  efficient  contract  from  date  two  onwards. 
Because  this  almost  eflicient  contract  is incentive  compatible  it  cannot  offer 
more  utility  than  the  efficient  contract  itself,  i.e.,  U”,(V)  >  -Ciesxib,+  + 
(a/( 1 -E))  Ci,Sn,h,(  Vy),  where  h,(  Vy) =  U”,(  VT) -  Ul;(  V).  So  it  is  suf- 
ficient  to  show that  (a/( 1 -  ~1))  CitS  x$z,J  Vpl) -+ 0 as a +  1. 
PROPOSITION  4.  For  given  V,  as CI -+  1 the  utility  of  the  lender  from  the 
efficient  contract  tends  to  the first-best  level. 
By  the  convergence  of  the  finite  horizon  value  functions  to  the  infinite 
horizon  value  functions  (Lemmas  2  and  3)  we have 
COROLLARY.  For  given  V,  and  any  E >  0,  there  are  an  a’  and  a  T’  such 
that  U”,(V)  >  Ci,  srcib:  -E  for  T  >  T’,  a >  CC’. 
The  intuition  behind  these  two  results  is  straightforward:  for  01  close  to 
unity  incentive  compatibility  can  be  attained  by  a  small  divergence  in  the 
Vys.  The  cost  of this  divergence  is  ZIGS zjh,(  Vy) which  is positive  because 
U”  is  concave.  It  goes  to  zero  faster  than  CI goes  to  unity  because  U”  is 
differentiable  and  hence  locally  linear. 
Although  the  efficient  contract  cannot  converge  uniformly  to  the 
first-best  contract,  a  weaker  result  can  be  proved. 
PROPOSITION  5.  For  any  history  h’  the  efficient  contract  payments 
converge  to  their  first-best  levels  as CC-+  1. 
7.  CONSTANT  ABSOLUTE  RISK  AVERSION 
A  special  case  of  Assumption  1  is  the  constant  absolute  risk  aversion 
utility  function  v(c) =  -exp(  -  Rc),  where  v : ( -  co, co) +  ( -  co, 0).  The 
optimality  equation  then  is  a  concave  programming  problem  since  the 
constraints  are  linear  in  exp( -  bi)  and  Vi,  and  the  maximand  is concave  in 
these variables.  Then  by  repeated  application  of the  operator  L,  and  letting 
A =  --CicS7ci  exp( -Re,)/(  1 -a),  the  discounted  utility  in  the  case  of 
autarky,  the  following  can  be  shown. 
PROPOSITION  6.  Zf  T=  CC and  v(c) =  -exp(  -  Rc)  then at  the optimum 
exp( -  Rbi)  =  -ai  ( V +  A ),  Vi =  di V +  (di -  1)  A,  where  the  ai  and  d;s  are INCOME  FLUCTUATION  381 
constants  satisfying  a,  >  ai-,  >  0,  dieI  Z  di  >  0,  CitS  nid,”  =  I, 
.Zi,  snia,:’  =  -A,  and  U,(V)=R-l(l-a)pl  {log(-V-A)+K),  where 
K=  Zi,  sni  log  ai +  a( 1 -  a)-’  L’itS~i  log  di. 
Let  I=  U,(V)  denote  the  level  of  indebtedness.  Then  the  amount 
borrowed  in  state  i  when  indebtedness  is  I  is  b;=  R-’  (K-log  a,)  - 
(1 -a)  Z. It  is  decreasing  in  income  since  ai >  a,-,  and  decreasing  in  the 
level  of indebtedness.  How  it  varies  with  history  depends  on  how indebted- 
ness  evolves.  The  constant  absolute  risk  aversion  utility  function  implies 
that  history  dependence  takes  a  very  simple  form  because  there  are  no 
income  effects.7  Loans  depend  only  on  the  number  of  times  each  state 
occurs  and  not  on  the  order  in  which  they  occur.  So  if rj  is the  number  of 
times  state j  occurs  in  history  h’  and  I,  is the  initial  level  of indebtedness, 
the  amount  lent  in  state  i at  date  t +  1 is 
b(h’,  flli) =  R-‘{(K-log  a;)  -Cj..rjlog  dj}  -  (1 -a)  I,.  (9) 
There  are  a  number  of  consequences  of  Eq.  (9).  First,  the  repayments 
from  the  borrower  to  the  lender  tend  to  minus  infinity  with  probability 
one.  To  see this  note  that  for  t long  enough  zj can  be approximated  by  tnj. 
Then  substituting  in  (9)  proves  the  result  since  Ciesrri  log  di>  0  (see 
Proposition  7(ii)  in  the  appendix).  (This  result  is  equivalent  to  Proposi- 
tion  3 because  of the  relationship  between  6, and  V given  in  Proposition  6.) 
Equally  expected  repayments  are  always  increasing. 
Second  it  is  possible  to  define  an  implicit  rate  of  interest,  independent 
of  time,  between  any  two  states.  Suppose  that  at  some  date  state  j  is 
announced  instead  of  state  i, j  <  i,  so  an  extra  payment  is  received  from 
the  lender.  Because  the  order  of announcement  does not  matter,  this  can  be 
corrected  at  a  later  date  by  announcing  i instead  of j,  so  that  I  returns  to 
the  value  it  would  have  had.  In  the  meantime  the  borrower  will  be  paying 
back  more  than  he  otherwise  would,  and  so 
rv =  -  log( d,/d,)/log(a,/a,) 
is  the  implicit  rate  of interest  between  states  i and  j.  There  are  N-  1 such 
independent  interest  rates,  defined  between  adjacent  states,  all  others  being 
weighted  averages  of these.  It  can  be  shown  that  0 <  rii  <  (1 -  a)/a  so that 
each  is  positive  and  less  than  the  rate  of  time  preference.  This  is  very 
intuitive  since  if it  is  to  provide  some  insurance  the  borrower  must  be able 
to  access funds  relatively  cheaply  when  necessary but  must  correspondingly 
receive  a relatively  low  rate  of return  on  his  savings.  In  the  limit  as a -+  1 
each  rii  -+ 0 so consumption  risk  can  be eliminated  (Yaari  [14]). 
It  should  be  remembered  that  these  are  purely  implicit  rates  of interest. 
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The  borrower  cannot  borrow  or  save  as  much  as  he  wants  to  but  only 
what  is  dictated  by  the  contract.  If  for  example  he  suffers a  series  of low 
income  levels  his  indebtedness  will  go  up  and  he  will  only  be  able  to 
borrow  less  and  less,  although  his  needs  and  future  prospects  have  not 
changed.  The  borrower  is  constrained  by  his  past  history.  We  summarise 
the  results  of this  section  by 
PROPOSITION  7.  If  T =  00 and v(c)  =  -  exp( -  Rc)  then (i)  an  invariant 
implicit  rate  of  interest  rij  is  defined  between  any  two  states, 
0 6  rii <  (1 -  a)/a,  for  each  i, j E S;  (ii)  expected payments  to  the  lender 
increase over  time,  and  (iii)  payments  to  the  lender tend  to  infinity  with 
probability  one. 
8.  SELF-ENFORCING  LOAN  CONTRACTS 
Proposition  3  showed  that  the  borrower’s  future  utility  will  become 
arbitrarily  negative  with  probability  one.  This  stretches  to  the  limit  the 
assumption  that  the  contract  is costlessly  enforceable.  Indeed  for  any  fixed 
penalty  associated  with  breach  of  contract,  Proposition  3  shows  that  the 
benefits  to  reneging  will  in  the  long  term  almost  surely  exceed  the  costs. 
Certainly  when  loans  are international  the  costs of reneging  are  likely  to  be 
low  as legal  sanctions  are  difficult  to  enforce  across  national  boundaries. 
An  efficient  contract  should  take  these possibilities  into  account.  So in  this 
section  we examine  the  situation  when  either  party  can  costlessly  renege, 
under  the  assumption  that  they  remain  in  autarky  after  one  of them  has 
reneged.  We  examine  self-enforcing  contracts  in  which  neither  party  ever 
has an  incentive  to  renege. 
If  the  borrower  has no  outside  opportunities  and  can  costlessly  renege  he 
will  do  so  whenever  the  net  gain  from  the  contract,  looking  forward,  is 
negative,  that  is  if  v(b,+  0J-  v(e,)+  crV, ~0.  Likewise  the  lender  will 
renege  if his  net  gain  is  negative.  Thus  the  constraints 
v(bi+8,)-v(B,)+crViBO,  iES  (10) 
-b,  + aU*(  Vi) > 0,  iES  (11) 
should  be added  to  the  definition  of the  one-step  operator  L  to  rule  out  the 
incentive  to  renege.  Changing  the  definition  of  L  in  this  way  does  not 
invalidate  the  dynamic  programming  approach  and  the  efficient  contract 
can  be  characterised  in  the  same  way  as  before.  The  argument  is  very 
similar  to  that  given  at  the  beginning  of Section  3,  where  the  words  “self- 
enforcing”  should  be added  to  “incentive  compatible.”  The  crucial  observa- 
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is  not  then  replacing  it  by  an  incentive  compatible,  self-enforcing  contract 
giving  the  borrower  the  same  utility  but  the  lender  more  means  that  the 
new contract  is  not  only  incentive  compatible  but  also  self-enforcing  and 
Pareto  superior.* 
Without  outside  enforcement  the  infinite  time  horizon  is  strictly 
necessary  to  avoid  the  unravelling  problem  familiar  from  finitely  repeated 
games  with  a  unique  stage  game  equilibrium.  That  is,  (10)  and  (11)  could 
only  be  satisfied  by  a zero  transfer  in  the  last  period,  and  therefore  only  by 
a zero  transfer  in  the  penultimate  period  and  so on,  so that  no  non-trivial 
contract  can  exist  in  the  finite  horizon  case. 
It  is  nevertheless  possible  to  show that  for  a  sufhciently  high  discount 
factor  a  non-trivial  contract  exists  for  an  infinite  time  horizon.  The  argu- 
ment  is as follows.  Consider  first  a simple  two-period  contract  which  differs 
only  slightly  from  autarky.  In  the  initial  period  if any  state  other  than  N 
is announced  then  no  transfers  are made  in  either  period.  However,  if in  the 
initial  period  state  N  is  announced  the  borrower  pays  an  amount  Ab,  to 
the  lender  and  consequent  upon  this  recieves  Ab  in  the  second  period 
irrespective  of  the  state.  These  are  chosen  so  that  the  borrower  is  just 
indifferent  about  announcing  N  when  it  occurs.  That  is,  v( -  Ab,  +  6,)  + 
aCiE,niv(Ab  +  0;) =  ~(0,)  +  aCicsrriv(Oi).  By  the  concavity  of  v  this 
contract  is  incentive  compatible  and  it  satisfies  (10).  The  expected  profit 
to  the  lender  is  n,(AbN  -  adb)  and  the  borrower  gets  a  zero  net  utility 
gain.  When  c1=  1  a  first  order  Taylor’s  approximation  yields  Ab,  = 
(Z  ,,srriv’(O,)/v’(~,))  Ab,  where  the  bracketed  term  is  greater  than  one.  So 
a  small  enough  Ab  can  be  found  that  expected  profit  is  strictly  positive. 
Now  keep  Ab  constant  at  this  level  and  reduce  (y:  below  one.  The  lender’s 
profits  and  Ab,  vary  continuously  with  t(, so profit  converges  to  a positive 
number  as a -+  1. Of  course  this  contract  violates  (11)  because  the  lender 
will  always  want  to  renege  in  the  second  period  when  he  has  to  pay  out. 
However,  if  this  two-period  contract  is  repeated  every  other  period,  thus 
forming  an  infinite  horizon  contract,  the  expected  profit  to  the  lender, 
z,,,(Ab,,,  -  aAb)/(  1 -  a2),  tends  to  infinity  as c(  -+  1. The  short-term  gain  to 
the  lender  from  reneging  in  the  second  period  is  no  more  than  Ab,  so  this 
will  be  outweighed  by  the  future  loss  of not  having  the  contract  if a is near 
one.  The  long-term  contract  therefore  satisfies  (10)  and  (11)  for  a near  one 
and  we conclude  that  a  non-trivial  contract  exists  for  such  an  a. 
Proposition  3  implies  that  one  of  the  constraints  in  Eq.  (10)  will  even- 
tually  bind,  so  an  efficient  self-enforcing  contract  will  be  different  from  a 
contract  which  was legally  enforceable.  It  would  be  interesting  to  know 
s In  a  labour  contracts  model  [  123  we  consider  the  pure  self-enforcement  problem  and 
show  how  this  may  be  tackled  using  dynamic  programming.  Broader  issues  relating  to  self- 
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whether  once  (10)  binds  the  contract  effectively  terminates,  that  is  no 
future  loans  or  repayments  are  scheduled,  or  whether  it  is  always 
worthwhile  to  schedule  future  loans  and  repayments.  That  is, can  termina- 
tion  be  used  as  an  incentive  device  or  not?  The  answer  is  negative:  if  a 
non-trivial  contract  exists  at  all,  there  must  be  a  contract  that  gives  the 
borrower  a  zero  net  gain  and  the  lender  a  strictly  positive  net  gain.  This 
dominates  a  termination,  where  both  get  zero,  so that  by  the  Principle  of 
Optimality  such a termination  could  not  be part  of an  efficient  contract.  To 
summarise: 
PROPOSITION  8.  If  both parties  can renege and have no  outside oppor- 
tunities  then  there  exists  some a.’ such  that  a  non-trivial,  self-enforcing 
contract  exists for  each  ~1  E (a’, 1).  Moreover  such a  non-trivial  efficient 
contract  will not  terminate. 
APPENDIX 
LEMMA  1.  U,(V)=L(Ukp,)(V)for  VE(-co,d,%,). 
Proof  (i)  We  first  show U,(  V) ,< L( U, _, )( V).  Define 
k-l  k  -1 
U[bk]  =  -E  1  a’b(h’),  U[bk:h’]=-E  c  a’b(h’):h’  . 
r=O  7=1+1  1 
U[b”]  is  the  net  gain  to  the  lender  from  the  contract  bk and  U[bk  : h’]  is 
the  net  gain  after  the  history  h’. Define  V[b”]  and  V[bk  : h’]  analogously. 
So  for  any  V(-co,d,)  and  any  bkEBk(V),  U[bk]=Zi.,zj(-bj+ 
U[bk  : so =  B;]).  Then  by  the  definition  of  U,_  1,  U[bk  : so]  < 
u&  ,( V[bk  : so])  and  since  (bi,  V[bk  : so  = Bi]);,s~  A( V),  zliGs ni( -bi  + 
u,-  L(  V[bk  : so =  e,])  6  L( U,--  r)( V[b”]).  Therefore  taking  the  supremum 
over  all  bk E Bk( V),  U,(V)  = sup  U[b”]  < L( U,_  ,)( V). 
(ii)  We  now  show  uk(  V) 2  L( U, _,  )(V).  There  exist  some 
(ai? Kh,  s CA(V)  and  E>O  such  that  Z,.S~i(-/li+alJk_,(Kj))> 
L(uk-,)(v)  -  E  for  any  V  E  (-co,  d,).  Equally  U[bk:  so =  Oil  2 
u&,(Ki)  -E,  where  [bk  : so =  Q,] eBk(Kj).  Let  p”  be  the  contract  which 
pays  /Ii  in  the  first  period  and  follows  [bk  : so =  ei]  thereafter.  Since  income 
is  i.i.d.  /?” E pk( V[/?“]).  So  U[Bk]  b  Cj,szi(  --pi  +  auks. ,(I&))  -  a& 2 
L( uk  -,  ) -  (1 +  a) E. Since  F is arbitrary,  when  the  supremum  is taken  over 
all bk E Bk( V),  Uk( V) k  L( Uk  1)( V). 
LEMMA  2.  F  is a complete metric space in the supremem  metric and L  is 
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Proof:  To  show that  F is a metric  space it  suffices to  show that  the  gap 
between  the  bounds  in  (4)  is  itself  bounded.  Since  v  is  increasing  and 
CiesZiV(y,,  +  Si) =  v(c,),  for  given  V, y,  +  fll  <c,  and  SO J’,~ +  fJi+  6, < 
y,+O,,,+dI<cm+O,,,.  Thus  yno+8i-c,~0N-~,  and  therefore  it 
must  be  the  case  that  y,+.Zi,s~i(Oi-c,)/(l-~)~(Oh.-O1)/(l-~). 
Completeness  is  standard.  For  any  iJ E F,  L(U)  can  be  no  greater  at  any 
point  than  the  upper  bound  in  (4)  since  otherwise  this  would  imply  that 
utilities  higher  than  the  first-best  could  be  achieved  by  ignoring  the 
incentive  constraints,  which  is  impossible.  Likewise,  if  L(U)  were  less  at 
any  point  than  the  lower  bound  in  (4),  utility  would  be less than  the  trivial 
incentive  compatible  contract,  despite  starting  with  a  value  function  no 
smaller  than  that  corresponding  to  the  trivial  contract,  again  an 
impossibility.  So  L(U)  E F.  That  L  is  a  contraction  now  follows  from 
standard  arguments. 
LEMMA  3.  Lim,  _ Ix  U,  =  L(lim,  _ x, U,). 
Proof.  Define  U,  =  lim,  _ u. U,.  It  is obvious  the  lender  can  do  at  least 
as  well  in  k +  1  periods  as  he  can  in  k  periods.  So  for  any  V,  U, < 
LU&L2Uo<  ..’  fL”U&  ‘..  <u,.  Hence  L“+‘U,,  <  LU,  and  taking 
limits  U,  f  LU,.  Again  since  L(LkU,)d  U,,  Cics(bi+~LkUO(Vi))< 
U,(V)  for  any  (bi,  Vi)i,,~/l(V).  So  taking  limits  Ci,s~i(-bi+aU,(V,)) 
d  U,,(V)  and  taking  the  supremum,  LU,(  V)  Q U,(V). 
LEMMA  4.  Assuming Uk-  ,( V)  is strictly  concave, at  the solution to  (2): 
(i)  the  local  downward  incentive  compatibility  constraints  always  bind, 
(ii)  there  is  coinsurance,  i.e.  -b,+aU(Vi)>  -bj-,+aU(V,-,)  and 
v(bi+8i)+aVj>v(bi-~+8i_,)+aVi_,,  (iii)  the  local  upward  incentive 
compatibility  constraints never bind. 
Proof:  (i)  It  is  first  shown  that  Ci,i-,  =  0. Suppose  to  the  contrary  that 
Ci,+  1 >  0,  for  some  i E S.  Then  Vi >  Vi-  I  since  bi-  1 >  bi.  Then  consider 
changing  (bi,  Vi)iss,  as follows:  keep  V,  fixed  and  if necessary  reduce  V, 
until  C2,1 =  0. Next  reduce  V,  until  C3,2 =  0,  and  so on,  until  Ci,+  i =  0 for 
all  iE S.  Add  the  necessary  constant  to  each  Vi  to  leave  EV,  unchanged 
overall.  Each  ( Vi -  Vi-  , )  has  been  reduced  so  the  lender’s  utility  is 
increased.  The  new  contract  offers  the  borrower  the  same  utility  and 
is  incentive  compatible  since  bi_,  2  6,  and  C,,+  1 =  0  together  imply 
Ci,i+  i >  0,  i.e.,  the  upward  constraints  hold.  Hence  the  original  contract 
has  been  improved,  contrary  to  assumption. 
(ii)  The  latter  follows  from  part  (i).  So  suppose  -  bi+  aU( Vi) < 
-  bi-  , +  aU( I/i-,  ).  Then  replacing  bi by  hip ,  and  V,  by  Vi-  1 raises  the 
lender’s  utility  but  leaves  the  borrower’s  utility  unchanged  and  is  also 
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(iii)  Suppose  we ignore  the  constraint  Ci-  I,i 2  0. If  bi-  1 3  bi  then  by 
(i)  the  upward  incentive  constraint  is  automatically  satisfied.  So  suppose 
that  the  solution  has  b, >  bj-  1. Then  Vi <  Vi-  I  and  C;_  i,i  ~0.  But  then 
replacing  bi_  , by  bi and  Vi-  1 by  Vi cannot  decrease  the  lender’s  utility  and 
cannot  violate  incentive  compatibility.  But  v(bi +  f3,  _ I ) -  v(bim.,  +  0, _ , ) > 
v(b, +  ei) -  v(bi _,  f  di)  =  a( Vi-  1 -  Vi)  since  v is  concave.  So  v(bi  +  O,-  ,) + 
aV,>  v(b,-  1 +  Bi-  1) +  crV,-  ,  and  the  borrower’s  utility  is improved. 
Proof  of Proposition  1.  It  is obvious  that  Uk(  V)  is  decreasing.  Assume 
U,-,(V)  is  strictly  concave.  Consider  any  V  and  V’  with  the  associated 
contracts  (bi,  V,)iGs,  (b;,  Vi)i,,.  Let  VT=SV,+(l-6)  V:  and  define  b,?’ 
by  v(b~+8,)=6v(b,+O,)+(l  -d)v(b:+Bi),  for  6~(0,  1).  So  (b,+,  V*)its 
gives  the  borrower  average  utility  and  the  lender  no  less  than  average 
utility.  Then  C,?i_ ,  =  c’K’,.~-~  +  (1 -8)  C:,,-  ,  +  dv(b,_,  +  13~)  +  (1 -6) 
v(b:-,  +B,)-  v(b,*_ 1  +  ei).  By  Lemma  4,  at  the  optimum,  C,,;-,  =O  and 
Cb+  1 =  0  and  since  the  risk  premium  is  a  decreasing  function  of 
income  (Assumption  1)  the  third  term  is  non-negative,  so  the  downward 
constraints  are  satisfied.  However,  the contract  (b,*,  VT)jt,  may  violate  the 
upward  incentive  contraints.  Nevertheless,,  using  a similar  argument  to  that 
used  in  Lemma  4(i),  it  is  possible  to  construct  a  new  contract  from 
(bT>  V?)ies  which  is  incentive  compatible  and  offers  both  the  lender  and 
the  borrower  no  less utility.  This  may  be  done  as follows.  Keep  V,  fixed 
and  reduce  Vz until  C2, 1 =  0  or  until  V, =  V2. Then  reduce  V3 in  the  same 
way  and  so  on.  Add  the  necessary  constant  to  each  Vi  to  leave  EV, 
unchanged  overall.  This  will  not  make  the  lender  worse  off.  Now  if 
Vz =  V,,  which  implies  bf  >  b:,  reduce  b,  until  C2., =O,  and  proceed  in 
the  same  way  for  b,  and  so  on;  since  bj +  19,  >  bj  f f  8,-  1 adding  a  con- 
stant  to  each  b, to  leave  Eb,  constant  cannot  make  the  borrower  worse off. 
So in  this  new contract  C,,_  , =  0 and  b,-  1 2  b,.  Thus  the  upward  incentive 
constraints  also  hold.  Strict  concavity  then  follows  because  it  is  not 
possible  to  have  both  hi =  b:  and  V, =  Vi  for  all  iE  S  and  V #  V’,  so  the 
contract  (b,f+, VT),,  s  yields  the  lender  strictly  more  than  6ZJk-  ,( V) + 
(1 -  6)  U,  _ , ( V’).  To  complete  the  induction  argument  observe  that  DT,  ( V) 
is  trivially  strictly  concave.  So  each  lJ,(  V)  is  strictly  concave,  and  their 
pointwise  limit,  U*(V),  must  be  concave.  Uniqueness  of  the  optimum 
contract  follows  because  it  is  not  possible  to  have  both  bi =  b:  and  Vi #  Vi 
for  all  2~ S  for  the  same  V,  so  non-uniqueness  would  imply  b, #  b:  for 
some  i,  and  the  constructed  contract  is  strictly  better,  true  also  for  an 
infinite  horizon.  To  prove  continuous  differentiability,  consider  a 
neighbourhood  of  values  of  V around  any  V’,  and  construct  an  incentive 
compatible  contract  for  each  V by  taking  the  optimum  contract  at  Y’  and 
keeping  the  future  utilities  constant  but  varying  the  b,‘s  so as to  maintain 
incentive  compatibility  and  give  V overall  (there  is a  unique  way  of doing INCOMEFLUCTUATION  387 
this).  The  lender’s  utility  is then  a concave  function  of  V by  a similar  argu- 
ment  to  that  given  above,  and  this  function  is  differentiable  and  equal  to 
Uk  at  I/‘.  The  result  follows  from  applying  Lemma  1 of  [a]. 
LEMMA  5.  (i)  U;(  V,)  <  U;(V)  <  Ui(  V,),  (ii)  VI  <  I/<  V,,  (iii)for  any 
I/’ E (-  co, d,)  and y <  UL( V’),  if  state N  is repeated r  times consecutively 
then U;(  I”+‘)  < y for  T large enough; likewise for  0 > y >  Ui(  V’)  zf state  1 
is repeated t  times consecutively  then UL( V*+‘)  2 y for  t  large enough. 
Proof  (i)  We  shall  show  that  U;(  V,)  <  U;(V);  the  argument  for 
U;(V)  <  U;(  V,)  is  symmetric.  Suppose,  contrary  to  assumption,  that 
U;(  V,)  >  U;(V).  Since  V,  3  Vi  for  all  in  S,  (8)  implies  U;(  Vi) =  U;(V) 
for  all  in  S.  So  using  the  first-order  conditions  (5)-(7),  v’(b,+  fIj) =  l/A  for 
all  in  S.  Hence  consumption  is stabilized,  and  U,  must  be  linear  between 
V,  and  V. Consider  some  V’ <  V and  the  associated  (b:,  Vl)ic,.  Let  v’  be 
the  smallest  value  such  that  Ui(  V’)  =  U!J V).  There  are  two  cases  to 
consider;  first  U;(  Vk)  3  U;(V)  =  U;(  Vi) =  Ui(  V’).  Since  V(N <  V  it  must 
be  true  that  U;(V)  =  U;(  v’)  by the  above  argument.  But  V’ is the  smallest 
value  such  that  U;(V)  =  U;(  V’),  so  VI  =  Vi and  6: =  6, for  all  i E S.  From 
incentive  compatibility,  Vi  =  Vi.-  1 implies  b( =  bi.- I,  a  contradiction.  The 
other  possibility  is  U;(  Vi)  >  UL( VX).  The  case  N  =  2  is  dealt  with  for 
simplicity;  the  argument  generalizes  straightforwardly.  From  (5)  and  (6) 
UL( Vi)=  -  l/v’(b,  +  0,)  so  b; >  b,.  From  (6)  Vi <  V,  and  from  (5) 
b; <  b,.  By  incentive  compatibility,  Vi  -  Vi >  V,  -  VI  implies  v(b,  + 0,) - 
v(b,  +  0,)  >  v(b;  +  8,)  -  v(b’, +  0,).  But  since  b; >  b,  and  b; <b,,  this  is  a 
contradiction. 
(ii)  Follows  immediately  from  (i)  and  concavity. 
(iii)  Consider  a  sequence  in  which  state  N  is  repeated  z  times 
consecutively.  With  V=  I”+‘-’  we have  V’+‘=  I/,,  using  the  notation 
in  the  text  where  V  is  the  current  value  of the  borrower’s  and  V,  is  next 
period’s  if  state  N  occurs.  So  V’+’  >  V’+‘-’  since  V,  >  V,  and  thus 
V t+r  >  I/‘.  Then  U:(  V”)  <  Ui(  V’)  since  U,  is  concave.  Suppose  no  r 
exists  such  that  U’( VI+‘)  <  y. Then  lim,  _ m UL( V’+‘)  >  y  or  equivalently 
lim,  +  oo  V’+’  <  4,  where  U;(4)  =  y;  both  limits  exist  by  the  concavity  of 
U,.  Note  that  the  contract  is  continuous  in  V  by  the  fact  that  the  con- 
straint  set A(V)  is a continuous  correspondence  and  the  optimum  contract 
is unique.  So-there  is a convergent  sequence  of contracts  as z +  co with  V, 
tending  to  V. The  limit  contract  must  be  optimum  when  V =  lim,  _ ai V’ + ‘, 
and  has  V,  =  lim,  _ m V’ + ‘,  so  VN =  V,  a contradiction.  Thus  r  as required 
exists.  The  case 0 >  y >  U;(  V’)  is proved  similarly. 
Proof  of  Proposition  3.  Ui  is  a  non-positive  martingale.  Therefore 
by  Doob’s  Convergence  Theorem  [6,  p. 2041  it  converges  almost  surely 388  THOMAS  AND  WORRALL 
to  some  random  variable,  R.  Recall  that  lim  y+  _ r  U:  =  0  and 
lim,4dr  U;(V)  =  -  co;  it  s&ices  to  show R  =  0  almost  surely.  Consider  a 
path  with  the  property  that  lim,,  s  Ui;(  V’)  =  C #O  and  state  N  occurs 
infinitely  often.  We  will  show  that  such  paths  cannot  exist.  Take  a  sub- 
sequence  composed  of those  dates  when  state  N  occurs.  This  sequence  must 
have  a convergent  subsequence  ( V “r’)r  =0, 1.,,,,  (since  it  eventually  belongs  to 
{ V : U;(  V) E [C  -  E, C +  E] 3 for  some  E >  0,  which  is  bounded),  and  call 
the  limit  IV.  Denote  the  general  relationship  between  successive  values  of 
V  by  V If1  =,f(  V’,  ei)  and  observe  that  f  is  continuous  in  V’  (see  the 
proof  of  Lemma  S(iii)).  So  the  sequence  (f(  V’(‘),  ~9~))~=~.,,,.,,  converges 
to  f(  W,  0,)  and  since  by  definition  f  =  Vtfr),  $,,,  =  V’(‘)+‘,  V”‘)+l 
converges  to  f(  W,  0,)  as  well.  But  both  lim,,  3?  Ui(  V’@‘)  =  C  and 
lim  r~mUpr’z)+‘)=C,  so  by  continuity  of  Ui  we  have  lJi(  W)  = 
Uk(f(  W,  0,))  =  C,  which  contradicts  Lemma  5(i).  Since  paths  where 
state  N  occurs  finitely  often  have  zero  probability,  the  probability  that 
lim  I _ m U;(  V’)  exists  and  is  non-zero  is zero,  which  completes  the  proof. 
Proof  of  Proposition  4.  By  the  mean  value  theorem  there  is  some 
K;  between  V;  and  V  such  that  h,( 1/y)  =  (Ug)’  (K;)(  V’-  V).  From  the 
incentive  constraints  V4 -  V:_,  =  (1 -  a) BJa,  where  B,  z  v(b,*_ , +  0;)  - 
v(bT  +  0;)  is a  constant  independent  of cx.  As 2’ieSrtr  V,: =  V, it  follows  that 
V;-  V=  V:(l  -~j)-~jzi~,V;=~~ij~j(Vg-  V,“)-C,,,n,(VJ-  VP)  and 
for  i >j,  Vy -  VJ =  2’;:;  Bk(  1 -  a)/~,  so substitution  gives 
(a/(1  -a))  1  v%(  v;)  =  5  n,  c  n,‘i’  Bk((  Vi,’  (K;)  -  (U;)’  (KY)). 
is.5  j-2  ,j-c  i  k=i 
Clearly  V,’ +  V,  since  V,’ -  V,l_ , =  B, (1 -  a)/a,  and  so K”  -P  V for  all  i E S. 
Let  U  be  the  pointwise  limit  of  U:  Since  Vi  is  concave  it  converges 
uniformly  on  all  compact  subsets  of  (-co,  d,)  and  it  is  differentiable 
almost  everywhere,  Let  D  be  the  set  of  points  where  U(V)  is  differen- 
tiable.  We  have  (UG)‘(K:)  >  (Ui(  L’S + p)  -  Uz(  V’))/p  for  p >  0.  So 
lim,,,(Uz)‘(K:)2(U(V+,u)-U(V))/p  or  lim,,,(US)‘(Ki”)~U’(V)  if 
VE  D,  in  the  limit  as  p -+ 0.  For  p <  0  the  inequalities  are  reversed,  so 
(U;)’  (KP)  -+  U’(V)  if  VE D  as  a -t  0.  Since  b,+  is  continuous  in  V  and 
U(V)  is  differentiable  almost  everywhere  the  result  is  proved. 
Proof  of  Proposition  5.  For  simplicity  (the  same  argument  can  be 
generalized)  assume  there  are just  two  states.  By  incentive  compatibility  in 
the  first  period  V;  -  V;  =  ((1 -  a)/a)(v(b;  +  19,) -  v(b;  +  0,)).  The  latter 
bracket  can  be shown  to  be  bounded,  so  Vs  -+  V. Since  (U’)‘(  V;)  ---f U’(V), 
from  (5)  and  (6),  v’(bg  +  fli)  +  -  l/U’(V)  =  v’(b,*  +  ei).  Therefore  bs  +  b:. 
Second  period  payments  in  state  i,  b{.  depend  on  VT,  as  does  Vz.  So 
reapplying  the  same  arguments,  V;  +  V,  6:  --) bJ* and  so  on. INCOME  FLUCTUATION  389 
Proof  of  Proposition  6.  The  solution  is clearly  feasible.  It  is also  easy to 
check  that  U,  is a fixed  point  of L.  The  ordering  of the  a,‘~  and  d;s follows 
from  adding  the  adjacent  upward  and  downward  incentive  constraints.  The 
other  conditions  are  derived  directly  from  (5),  (6),  and  (7). 
Proof  of  Proposition  7.  We  take  each  part  of the  proof  in  turn. 
(i)  Since  ai 3  aj,  and  dj d d,  for  i>j,  riib  0.  As  log  is  concave 
rij =  -(log  di--  log  die ,)/(log  ai--  log  a,_ ,)  <  -(d,  -  dj_ ,)  a,/(a,-  ai_ 1) di. 
By  Eq.  (1)  and  Lemma  4  -ci(aj-a;-,)=cr(d;-dip,),  where  ci= 
exp(  -RQ,),  so  rji<  c,a,/ud,.  But  from  (5)  and  (6)  c,a,<  (1 -a)  di. 
Therefore  ri,ip,  <  ( 1 -  cc)/c~.  By  definition  ri.ip 2 is a  convex  combination  of 
r+  l  and  rj-  i.i--2,  SO  ri,i-2<  (1 -  a)/~..  As  it  holds  for  i = 2, 3, .  .  .  . N, 
ri, <  (1 -  M)/CX  for  all  i,jE  S. 
(ii)  By  definition  expected  payments  change  each  period  by 
-R-‘~i~,~;logd,=R-‘~;~sn;logd,~‘<R-’logCi~S~id;1=0. 
(iii)  By  the  strong  law  of  large  numbers  Tj/t  converges  to  rci 
almost  surely,  so  -R-  ‘Ci,  s(zi/t)  log  d,  converges  almost  surely  to 
-R-‘CiEsnilogdi,  which  is  negative  by  (ii).  So  -tR-’  CiE,(zi/t)logdi 
converges  to  -co,  almost  surely,  which  from  the  formula  for  b(h’,  Oi) 
proves  the  result. 
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